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Cette page est publiée en anglais et en ukrainien ; la version anglaise figure ci-dessous.

CSP and what the widget stores in the browser

For developers, in code: the Content-Security-Policy a page needs, what the widget stores on the visitor's device, and what it never does.

Content-Security-Policy

If your page sets a CSP, the widget needs these allowances. Replace the two hosts with the ones in your install snippet.

Directive Value Why
script-src https://<widget host> blob: the bundle; blob: for the microphone’s audio worklet
connect-src https://<agent host> wss://<agent host> GET /widget/config, the /ws and /ws/stt sockets, /tts, the beacons
media-src blob: data: spoken answers are audio clips fetched from /tts and played from one <audio> element
img-src https://<your CDN> the host of the launcher image, uploaded or pasted

Styles are inside the shadow root and need no style-src allowance beyond what your page already permits for inline styles there; if your policy forbids inline styles entirely, test — the widget writes its CSS into a <style> element in its own shadow tree.

What the widget stores on the visitor’s device

Everything is in localStorage, per origin, best-effort: a browser with storage disabled or full simply does not persist, and nothing breaks.

Key What How long
sa:widget:<code> up to 10 conversations of up to 50 messages each, the active one, whether the widget was open, the remembered mode (text or voice) each conversation 7 days after its own last activity; the session fields 45 minutes after the last write
sa:widget:prefs:<code> the dragged position, that the widget was ever opened, when the greeting teaser was dismissed, which proactive findings were shown on which path, the chosen spoken language no expiry

No cookies. Nothing is written for attribution: a campaign the visitor arrived on is sent with the first message of a conversation and never stored on the device, so navigating before chatting loses it — the accepted price of not handing the owner a consent obligation.

What the widget never does

  • It never reads the page unless the owner turned page actions on, and then it reads state (which fields exist, whether they are filled) — the text in a field leaves the browser only under the owner’s page_read_values switch, and passwords, hidden fields and anything under data-sa-private never. Reading the screen.
  • It never opens the microphone or plays sound without a press.
  • It never navigates to another origin on its own; a link elsewhere is shown, not followed.
  • It never stores the user token you relay with Shukai.setUser; the token is held in memory and sent with each message. User identity.

Logging out on a shared device

Shukai.clearUser() forgets the relayed token. Shukai.clearHistory() wipes every conversation on the device and the remembered mode. On a shared browser, call both at logout — the second is the one that stops the next person seeing the previous visitor’s chats. JavaScript API.

Where the data goes

Conversations are stored on servers in the EU for as long as the site’s plan keeps them, then deleted; no IP address is stored; the owner’s data-and-control page says the rest. For the developer, the one fact that matters: the runtime the widget talks to is the data-agent-base in the snippet, and nothing else.